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USING MATHEMATICAL MODELS IN A UNIFIED
APPROACH TO PREDICTING THE NEXT EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASE

Tiffany L. Bogich, Kevin 1. Olival, Parviez R. Hosseini, Car]os
Zambrana-Torrelio, Elizabeth Loh, Sebastian Funk, Ilana L.
Brito, Jonathan H. Epstein, John S. Brownstein, Damien O.
Joly, Marc A. Levy, Kate E. Jones, Stephen S. Morse, A. Alonso
Aguirre, William B. Karesh, Jonna A. K. Mazet, and Peter Daszak

Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) pose a significant threat to human health, global economies, and
conservation (Smolinski et al. 2003). They are defined
as diseases that have recently increased in incidence
(rate of the development of new cases during a given
time period), are caused by pathogens that recently
moved from one host population to another, have
recently evolved, or have recently exhibited a change in
pathogenesis (Morse 1993; Krause 1994). Some EIDs
threaten global public health through pandemics with
large-scale mortality (e.g., HN/AIDS). Others cause
smaller outbreaks but have high case fatality ratios
or lack effective therapies or vaccines (e.g. Ebola virus
or methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus). As a
group, EIDs cause hundreds of thousands of deaths
each year, and some outbreaks (e.g., SARS, H5N1)
have cost the global economy tens of billions of
dollars. Emerging diseases also affect plants, livestock, and wildlife and are recognized as a Significant
threat to the conservation of biodiversity (Daszak
et al. 2000). Approximately 60% of emerging human

disease events are zoonotic, and over 75% of these
diseases originate in wildlife (Jones et al. 2008). The
global response to such epidemics is frequently reactive, and the effectiveness of conventional disease
control operations is often "too little, too late': With
rising globalization, the ease with which diseases
spread globally has increased dramatically in recent
times. Also, interactions between humans and wildlife
have intensified through trade markets, agricultural
intensification, logging and mining, and other forms
of development that encroach into wild areas. Rapid
human population growth, land use change, and
change in global trade and travel require a shift toward
a proactive, predictive, and preventive approaches for
the next zoonotic pandemic.
The key emergence event for most infectious diseases is a change in transmission dynamics within or
between host populations. The interconnectedness
of humans, domestic animals, and wildlife facilitates
the spillover of pathogens between hosts (Daszak
et al. 2000). External forces, such as agricultural
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intensification, global travel, and the accidental translocation of pathogens, augment this interaction. The
role of zoonotic pathogens in causing human disease may be particularly important because when
these diseases first emerge, humans have no acquired
immunity to novel pathogens, resulting in sometimes
highly lethal infections (e.g., AIDS/HIV, Ebola virus
disease).
Despite the huge social, demographic, and economic impact of EIDs, there has been little advancement in understanding how anthropogenic changes
drive disease emergence and in developing proactive,
predictive, and preventive approaches (Hufnagel et al.
2004; Weiss and McMichael 2004; Ferguson et al.
2005; Wolfe et al. 200S). In this chapter, we describe
a strategy to create a unifying predictive model for
the zoonotic and pandemic potential of a given region
by integrating predictive models of each stage of
the process of zoonotic disease emergence. The three
stages of emergence that we address are (1) a "preemergence" phase, where anthropogenic changes
cause animal populations to come into contact, leading to cross-species transmission of their pathogens,
(2) a spillover stage, where animal pathogens enter
human populations, and (3) pandemic emergence,
where pathogens are able to exploit human travel and
trade networks to emerge across international and
regional boundaries. Each stage of the emergence
process requires a different approach and analyses at
different scales. Each of these modeling exercises is
then linked to data collection on the ground. Models
are then parameterized through effective active and
passive surveillance of wildlife, monitoring of keywords in media, and analysis of published literature.
This modeling approach also helps to increase
surveillance efficiency by facilitating spatial and species-specific (e.g., phylogenetic) targeting of wildlife
to sample for likely zoonotic pathogens. Our strategy
is designed for the early detection of novel pathogens
with human pandemic potential, to allow animal and
human health professionals the opportunity to predict emergence and prevent spread. It also provides
the tools to target important sentinel species at active
human interfaces to improve on the efficiencies of
previous surveillance for rare pathogens of interest.
Our vision is to expand on lessons learned in order to
better assess local capacity, increase the value ofinfectious disease modeling, implement targeted and adaptive wildlife disease surveillance systems, develop and

deliver new technologies to improve efforts in hotspots,
and use cutting-edge information management and
communication tools to bring the world closer to realizing an integrated, globalized approach to controlling
emerging zoonotic diseases.
In this chapter, we focus in particular on three key
steps in designing this integrated modeling and field
surveillance approach: (1) the selection of geographic
sites for surveillance, (2) the selection of target species
for sampling, and (3) the construction of predictive
models of spread and future emergence (Table 42.1).

DEFL"'ITIONS, DRl VERS,
AND ErASES

History and Debate over the Definition
of an EID
In the introduction to this chapter, we defined EIDs
as diseases that have recently increased in incidence,
have moved from one host population to another, are
caused by recently evolved strains, or exhibit a change
in pathogenesis. We use this definition because,
despite the widely accepted importance of EIDs,
there is little agreement on the exact properties that
classify a disease as "emerging:' While the term has
generally been used to emphasize the novelty of a
given infectious disease, closer inspection reveals that
there is no consensus on what defines this novelty.
With an increasing number of studies investigating
the phenomenon of emergence and the underlying
environmental and anthropogenic drivers (e.g., Taylor
et al. 2001; Jones et al. 2008), it is important to agree
on a medically and biologically meaningful definition
of emergence. Such a definition should, in principle,
allow one to decide not only whether a given infectious disease can be called "emerging", but also when
and where exactly it emerged, and to do so via rigorous and quantifiable criteria.
The first mention of EIDs that can be found on
MEDLINE was provided by Oster (1961), who concentrated solely on animal diseases but supplied a
definition that can be generalized to human diseases.
He describes the "sudden invasion by epizootic diseases into countries where they have never before
struck" and mentions that these "have been described
as 'emerging diseases; a new term which would seem
to indicate new infectious disease situations."
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Table 42.1 Summary of Questions, Approaches, and Results Related to Three Components ofEID
Surveillance and Prediction
Objective

Questions

l. Selecting

- What is the risk of transmission to humans?
geographic - What is the distribution of undiscovered
sites for
pathogens? What areas have been
surveillance
undersampled?
- What are the spatial drivers of disease
emergence?
- How will the risk of disease emergence
change geographically?
2. Selecting
- Which wildlife species are the greatest risk
species for
of being the source for zoonotic disease
sampling
emergence?

3. Predicting

spread and
future
emergence
events

- Can the potential of a region to produce
pandemic pathogens be measured?
- Can the vulnerability of a region to the
spread of an BID be determined?

There are two ways in which a disease can be considered new (Table 42.2). In the first instance, the
definition can be relatively specific. A disease may be
"emerging" in that it has crossed the species barrier to
infect a novel host, or that its clinical signs or symptoms or pathogenicity has changed. In other words,
the disease is genuinely new to a host. In this sense,
every disease can emerge only once in each host. Some
diseases, such as measles (Babbott and Gordon 1954),
sleeping sickness (Steverding 2008), and bubonic
plague (Hays 2006), emerged in prehistoric or ancient
times, whereas others, such as Ebola virus (World
Health Organization 1978), Nipah virus (Chua et al.
2000), and SARS (Guan et al. 2003), emerged in
recent years.
Some authors, on the other hand, have proposed
defining BIDs in the wider purview of all diseases that
are increasing in incidence (Institute of Medicine
1992; Morse 1993; Levins et al.1994; Morse 1995; Jones
et al. 2008). This approach includes not only diseases
that are genuinely new in a host and are increasing in

Approach

Result

Spatial and
temporal
general
linear
models

- Geographically refined
surveillance
strategies
- Refined "hotspot"
maps
- Sub-regional "hotspot"
maps

Spatial and
temporal
general
linear models

- Refined surveillance
strategies according
to phylogenetic
relatedness and
contact opportunities
Matrix-based - A global emerging
population
infectious disease
simulation
vulnerability map

incidence by virtue of being recognized in the first
place, but also diseases that were previously present at
a lower level or are expanding to new areas. In this
sense, a disease can emerge and re-emerge multiple
times and in different locations.
With increasing interest in emerging infectious diseases, it is important to agree on the meaning of the
term, which has been used for a variety of different and
sometimes seemingly unrelated phenomena. In previous definitions, it has been interpreted in two ways: as
the appearance of a new pathogen in humans or as a disease becomes a growing concern. These two scenarios
can be distinguished by differentiating between primary
and secondary emergence. For this chapter, we limit our
focus to those EIDs that can infect humans. On the
basis of the distinction between primary and secondary
emergence, the following definitions are proposed for
an emerging infectious disease (Table 42.2):

• Primary emergence: A novel infectious disease
appears in humans by means of transmission from
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Table 42.2 Previous Definitions ofEIDs
Primary Emergence

Secondary Emergence

New host

Detection

New symptoms

Increased

Expansion

incidence
Oster (1961)
Lederberg et al. (1992)
Morse (1993)
Levins et al. (1994)
Morse (1995)
Garnett and Holmes (1996)
Kilbourne (1996)
Included factors of primary emergence were crossing of the species barrier to adapt to a new host (humans), the appearance of new symptoms
or new pathogenicity, and new detection of a disease. Included factors of secondary emergence were an increase in incidence and expansion to
a new area. Morse (1995) lists the appearance of an infection "for the first time" as emergence, which fits all categories of primary emergence,
without being explicit about the mechanisms.

animals or the environment and adaptation to
infecting humans, or through evolution within
human hosts to develop new pathogenicity or
resistance to treatment. In this case the first
recorded cluster in humans is taken as the EID
event. If an earlier case than the previously earliest
known case is found retrospectively (as has
happened for HIV), the timing of the event
should be corrected accordingly.
Secondary emergence: An existing infectious
disease increases in incidence in a population in a
way that constitutes a significant change with
respect to a baseline incidence. This is the case
when a disease occurs where it has never
previously been reported (and the baseline
incidence was zero), or when a disease displays a
trend of increasing incidence with respect to a
non-zero incidence. The timing of the emergence
event, in this case, should be the beginning of the
increase.

Characterizing the Drivers
of Emergence
Despite the threat posed by EIDs, we still do not fully
understand the mechanism of emergence; instead, we
rely heavily on a reactive approach of responding to
pathogens after they have emerged. We must first take
a broad-scale, ecological approach to understanding

the processes driving emergence. The process of
disease emergence is complex and generally driven
by factors that "provide conditions that allow for a
select pathogen to expand and adapt to a new niche"
(Smolinski et al. 2003). These factors are largely environmental, ecological, political, economic, and social
forces, which function on a range of different scales.
During the past two decades, numerous studies have
classified emerging diseases according to the factors
underlying their emergence, commonly referring to
these factors or processes as drivers of emergence.
The first attempt to classify drivers of emergence
was published by the Institute of Medicine (10M)
in 1992 (Lederberg et al. 1992). This report identified six factors in the emergence of infectious diseases:
(1) human demographics and behavior; (2) technology and industry; (3) economic development and land
use; (4) international travel and commerce; (5) microbial adaptation and change; and (6) breakdown of
public health measures. These factors are not mutually
exclusive and are relevant to different stages of emergence (e.g., spillover or an increase in incidence).
Seven additional drivers were added in a follow-up
10M report in 2003 (Smolinski et al. 2003): "human
susceptibility to infection," "climate and weather,·
"changing ecosystems;' "poverty and social inequi~·
"war and famine," "lack of political will;' and "intent to
harm:' Other studies have found that disease emergence from animal hosts to humans is driven mainly
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by anthropogenic forces, such as land use change (Patz
et al. 2004) or global trade and travel across ecological
and environmental boundaries (Hufnagel et aI. 2004).
The classification of these "factors in emergence"
paved the way for research with respect to the underlying drivers of infectious disease emergence.
At larger spatial scales, datasets are freely available
for many of these drivers (e.g., human population density or land use change). Analyzing these datasets
allows us to move beyond a correlative approach for
testing drivers of disease to a predictive framework
(jones et al. 2008; Dunn et al. 2010). Datasets for each
driver are often correlated, so it is important to check
for independence among variables when using multiple driver datasets in a single analysis. Determining,
quantifying, and ranking drivers of emergence at
smaller spatial scales can be more complicated. Often
an emergence event arises from multiple drivers interacting simultaneously or sequentially. Further, the
time lag between the driver acting directly on a host,
pathogen, or environment and the origin of the emergence event can vary. The duration of this time lag may
scale with organism generation time; for example, a
driver acting directly on pathogens (short generation
time) would have a much smaller lag in effect than a
driver acting on a mammalian host species (longer
generation time).
The spread of genetically based resistance will
always lag behind the emergence of a pathogen and
may be affected by other drivers. One could estimate a
probability curve for this, and estimate lag time based
on the slope of the curve. While drivers of emergence
are indeed complicated, we can still make inferences
on the role of multiple drivers acting simultaneously
or sequentially, the time lag between drivers and
emergence, and the possibility of unintentional drivers, those that were originally thought to be mitigating
forces.

Quantifying Missing Reports and
Biases in Reporting
EXisting datasets have identified over 3SO infectious diseases that have emerged in the past 70 years
(Woolhouse and Gaunt 2007; Jones et al. 2008; Dunn
et al. 2010). It is likely, however, that there have
been numerous unreported cases of novel diseases.
Whether the numbers of emerging infectious diseases are on the rise or health officials have merely

6n

grown more aware of these events is debatable and
can only be estimated against the backdrop of the
highly uneven surveillance capabilities across the
globe. EID surveillance has become a high-priority
issue for both local and global health authorities,
thereby making reporting more equitable. Thorough,
accurate disease surveillance reporting relies on
comprehensive, unbiased participation of all national
and sub-national health agencies. This has been
highlighted in recent years by the SARS epidemic,
HSNI highly pathogenic avian influenza, the global
HINI influenza pandemic, and, most poignantly, ilie
ongoing HIV pandemic.
These diseases, whose spread may have at one
time been constrained locally, are increasingly transcending national boundaries (Institute of Medicine
2009). Local outbreaks are of concern to the global
community because of their potential for pervasive
spread. We rely on human reports of these types of
local events to detect epidemics with pandemic potential that require global action. However, this type
of participatory reporting is incomplete and biased
due to an uneven distribution of health systems, detection mechanisms, and communication infrastructure.
Disincentives to reporting, such as negative political
and economic consequences of control measures,
may also result in reporting bias. When trying to
determine the underlying drivers for global disease
emergence events, the source of biases in reporting
must be accounted for to ensure that true differences
are reported rather ilian artifacts of sampling or
reporting.
A number of factors may affect the probability
of detecting novel BIDs or influence the lag time
between infection and detection of a novel pathogen.
Factors intrinsic to both the pathogen and the exposed
individual-such as ilie pathogen's virulence and the
individual's socioeconomic status-will determine
whether the individual seeks medical attention and
whether the medical examiner identifies the infection
as novel. Unusually infectious or virulent pathogens
may have a greater chance of being reported due to
large numbers of infected individuals or more detrimental health effects. Long latency periods, during
which individuals are asymptomatic, lead to temporal
biases due to the lag time between the initial case and
detection, as was the case with variant CreutzfeldtJakob disease and HN/ AIDS, which is suspected
to have emerged in the United States more than a
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decade before it was identified in 1981 (Gilbert et al.
2007).

'\ledicin~

SITE SELECTIO"J. SPECIES
SELECTlOK, AND PREDICTIVE
MODELfKG

Socioeconomic factors also playa role both as a
driver of disease emergence and as a source of reporting bias. Lower-income countries have higher rates of
Select Geographic Sites for
malnutrition and reduced access to potable drinking
Surveillance
water, sanitation, immunizations, and health services
(Ruger and Kim 2006; World Health Organization Jones et al. (2008) provided an example of a compre2010). Furthermore, many low-income countries, par- hensive approach to identifying sites as priority areas
ticularly in sub-Saharan Mrica, are faced with double- for sampling for the next EIDs. These sites have been
digit HIV infection rates. These populations are dubbed "hotspots" and represent areas of higher ErD
more susceptible to EIDs due to greater exposure to risk. This process of identifying EID hotspots began
infective agents and depressed immunity. Whether or with an exhaustive literature search to collect biologinot infected individuals in low-income countries cal, temporal, and spatial data for EID "events" in
receive medical attention depends also on the avail- human populations between 1940 and present. Jones
ability, accessibility, and appropriateness of medical et al. (2008) based their database of EIDs on previous
services and the individual overall ability to use them work (Taylor et al. 2001) and updated it with addi(Ensor and Cooper 2004). GDP and population den- tional information on microbial pathogens. All types
sity are the strongest correlates with the supply of of pathogens found in humans were entered into
qualified medical staff, healthcare facilities, diagnos- the database, including sexually transmitted diseases
tics, and treatments (World Health Organization (STDs), zoonoses, drug-resistant microbes, vector2010 ).
borne diseases, and food- and water-borne infections.
The first step in correcting for this reporting bias Information on time, location, pathogen type, transof EIDs is to identify the sources for potential bias mission mode, other hosts, and pathogen life history
in the data. Then, proxies may be determined that help traits was added. Further, the most commonly cited
account for this non-random bias (i.e., distance to causes of emergence for each pathogen were deternearest hospital, use of traditional medicine, or per mined (Daszak et al. 2000; Smolinski et al. 2003;
capita spending on healthcare). Reporting of disease Morens et al. 2004; Patz et al. 2004; Weiss and
is also non-random throughout the world because of McMichael 2004). Finally, shape files defining the
local capacity to conduct and publish research, and published boundaries of the initial emergence event
the dearth of investigation taking place in underdevel- were created in ArcGIS (ESRI 2005).
oped and hard-to-reach areas. To control for this when
The final published database covered global events
building their model of global EID risk, Jones et al. between 1940 and 2004 and reported 335 EID events
(2008) constructed an index of sampling bias based in humans. Using these 335 EID events, a risk model
on author addresses of publications in the Journal of was constructed using logistic regression to deterInfectiOUS Disease from 1973 to 2008.
mine the probability of an EID event in every I-degree
Caution must be taken in choosing potential data- grid cell of the world. These estimates are based on
sets to act as proxies for bias measures. There must be historical patterns of EID events and their environquantification or evidence supporting a mechanistic mental and biological drivers (including human poplink between the proxy and the outcome. Using this ulation density and growth, mammal diversity,
approach, we posit that the number of infectious dis- precipitation, temperature, latitude, and reporting
eases to have emerged over the past half-century is effort). Then, an EID risk value was calculated for
likely much greater than we had previously anticipated. every I-degree grid cell of the world using human popOthers have also suggested that recent exposure events ulation density and growth, mammal density, latitude,
are more common, as a result of more suboptimal and rainfall with the coefficients of the multivariate
attempts by pathogens to invade novel populations in logistic regression model (Jones et al. 2008).
the past-sometimes termed "viral chatter" (Antia
Previous efforts to understand patterns of
et al. 2003; Woolhouse et al. 2005; Wolfe et al. 2007).
EIDs have highlighted viral pathogens (particularly
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negative-stranded RNA viruses) as a major threat
because of their high rates of nucleotide substitution,
often poor copy-editing, and higher capacity to adapt
to new hosts (higher "evolvability"j Burke 1998).
However,Jones et al. (2008) found that a majority of
EID pathogens were bacterial, specifically novel drugresistant strains. Controlling for reporting effort, the
number of EIDs still showed a highly significant relationship with time (generalized linear model with
Poisson errors, offset by 10g(JID articles) (GLMp,]ID)'
F"" = 96.4, P < 0.001), supporting the widespread
claim that the threat ofEIDs to global health is increasing (Fauci 2001j Smolinski et al. 2003j Morens et al.
2004j King et al. 2006). Even after controlling for
reporting effort, the number ofEID events originating
in wildlife reached the highest proportion in the most
recent decade, highlighting the importance of understanding the factors that increase the contact between
wildlife and humans in developing any predictive
model. The strong relationship between high wildlife
host biodiversity-primarily found in low-latitude
developing countries-and EID events caused by
zoonotic pathogens from wildlife (e.g., SARS, Ebola)
suggests that these geographic regions will continue
to be a key source of novel EIDs in the future. It also
reinforces the need for pathogen surveillance in wild
animal populations as a forecasting measure for EIDs
(Karesh and Cook 2005j Kuiken et al. 2005j King et al.
2006). Jones et al. (2008) found that areas of the
planet with the greatest EID risk also had the lowest
levels of surveillance effort, therefore highlighting the
importance of this approach for public health resource
allocation.
We have since updated the driver data and spatial
resolution of the risk model in Jones et al. (2008). The
original spatial resolution was approximately lOO-km'
grid cells of the worldj using the native resolution of
the driver datasets, we have reduced this resolution to
1 km', allOWing for country-level EID risk maps to be
drawn at a resolution useful for regional-level planning. Mammal diversity per l-km' grid cell was calculated using range maps based on Mammal Species
of the World 2005. Human population density and
growth were updated according to the Global RuralUrban Mapping Project and the Gridded Population
of the World (http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/gpw).
At the global scale, the l-km risk map was developed
using the same model coefficients as in Jones et al.
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(2008), but incorporates new driver datasets as
described above at their native resolution, so the
distribution of wildlife zoonotic EID risk (Fig. 42.1)
is qualitatively comparable to that of the original
risk map. At the country level, the improved datasets
allow us to examine the influence of the two main
drivers, mammal diversity and human population
density, on EID risk.
EID risk maps can allow us to select sites for sampling that we believe to be more likely to harbor the
next EID-causing pathogen in wildlife. We can also
test the hotspots model by sampling in paired "hot"
and "cold" sites. This allows for the constant feedback
of field data into models to revise and update the
prediction ofEID risk.

Seleet Species to Target for Sampling
Life-History Tralts
Species are not equal in their ability to harbor and
transmit infectious diseases. For example, there is
some debate as to whether certain characteristics
of bats (e.g., their longevity, colonial roosting habits,
and ability to fly and hibernate) may make them better
viral reservoirs than otrer groups of mammals (see
Chapter 14 in this book). A recent analysis of bat
hosts and viruses (Turmelle and Oliva12009) shows
that some species in a given area will be more likely
to harbor a greater number of viruses than others, and
that population genetic structure (FSyj related to migratory capacity and mixing of genetic populations) significantly correlates with their known viral diversity.
F Sy is a measure of the genetic mixture of individuals
between populations. Turmelle and Olival (2009) used
a combined model that includes FsT' the International
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) species
threat status, and a measure of research sampling bias,
and found that these variables account for 33% of
known viral diversity in bats (p = 0.02). Approaches
similar to this, which account for species-specific
ecological and evolutionary traits, may be useful
for identifying species with the highest projected
pathogen viral richness. We can combine this
approach with a geographically targeted one to identify the most cost-effective species (bats and other
species) and locations to target for active wildlife
surveillance.
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Figure 42.1 :
Global map of zoonotic emerging disease hotspots risk from wildlife based on the Jones et al. (2008) model and updated
mammal diversity and human population density and growth driver datasets. Risk is given by a scale from low (0.00, white)
to high (1.00, black) risk.

Ph;r logenetic Relatedness
Another factor in the process of emergence is host
relatedness with humans. Potential similarities that
arise from shared ancestry, such as receptors that allow
a virus to enter a cell, may playa major role in facilitating spillover of pathogens. To date, this assumption
has not been explicitly tested in a phylogenetic framework, especially fo r viruses. Using host and pathogen
data from the Jones et al. (2008) database, we have
examined the distribution of wildlife and domestic
hosts for pathogens known to cause human disease.
Mammals appear to host the greatest proportion of
pathogens emerging from wildlife to infect humans
(Fig. 42.2) . We constructed a database of all known
mammal-virus associations to test the importance
of phylogeny in estimating the probability of a virus
being shared between a non-human mammalian
host and humans. The final mammal-virus association database consisted of over 1,200 pairs, including

over 300 unique mammal species and over 200
unique virus species. We also tested whether the probability of a virus being shared between mammal hosts
and humans increased with increasing human-host
contact.
After correcting for biases in reporting effort, we
found that the probability of humans and non-human
mammal hosts sharing a virus increased with increasing phylogenetic relatedness. Further, the probability
of humans and non-human mammal hosts sharing a
virus also increased with increasing contact opportunity, either through domestication or shared habitat.
These results, combined with life-history trait targeting and hotspot mapping, improve our understanding
of host-pathogen transmission and help to provide
basic guidance in the identification of wildlife species
most likely to be the source of the next EID in humans.
This understanding lays the groundwork for us to
begin to predict the consequences of anthropogenic
activities that increase interaction between humans,

Mathematical Models to Predicting Emerging Diseases

Figure 42.2:
The number of human EID events identified by Jones et al.
(2008) by host species, as recorded in the original database.
Mammals are responsible for by far the greatest number of
human EIDs recorded thus far.

domestic animals, and wildlife, such as logging, hunting, or building roads.
Future research is also necessary to understand
the relative importance of host phylogeny versus contact opportunity with humans. This will allow for a
better surveillance strategy that targets wildlife and
domestic host species most likely to be the source of
the next EID in humans. Using the model of phylogenetic relatedness and contact opportunities described,
these findings could be advanced further by using a
Gap Analysis, a tool used to assess decision-making in
conservation to identify areas that have been undersampled for pathogens relative to mammalian (and
phylogenetic) diversity.

Contact Opportunities and Risk Interfaces
Human contact with wildlife species, both direct and
indirect, is undoubtedly an important factor in the
transmission and emergence of new human pathogens
from wildlife. High-risk contact interfaces could be
the starting point for investigating pathogen diversity
and prevalence (total number of cases of a disease in a
population at a given time) in wildlife. Using estimates
of the range and distribution of pathogen prevalence
and incidence of every known EID family, we can use
power calculations to look at how many individuals of

each reservoir species need to be sampled within a
given set of species in a specific interface. Calculating
an expected prevalence of known EID families
allows us to recognize unusual events during routine
sampling.
Our vision is that sampling of high-risk interfaces could be conducted over multiple seasons to
obtain a baseline species diversity dataset. Then teams
can determine the number of individuals per species
needed for sampling to increase detection probability
using estimated prevalence values for known pathogens (see Chapter 39 in this book). Next, a set of target
species in the risk interface could be sampled, using
the minimum number of individuals required for
improved detection. Then if the prevalence is unusually high, teams could conduct follow-up sampling of
species identified and appropriate potential spillover
hosts, in intact or native range where possible.

Construct Predictive Models of Spread
and Future Emergence
Finally, once we have a good grasp of historical disease
data, current disease risk, and the socioeconomic,
environmental, and biodiversity profile of a given
region, we can analyze the likelihood that a given
pathogen could break out and become trulypandemic
(as defined by cross-continental transmission). Our
group has developed a vulnerability map of this
type for avian influenza (Hosseini et al. 2010) that
examined travel routes, airplane travel capacity, and
connections between all major airports using ten years
of information from Freedom of Information Act
requests to the u.s. Fish and Wildlife Service on the
global wildlife trade, trade data from the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, and data
from the International Airline Transport Alliance.
Trade routes, export and import statistics, travel, and
wildlife trade patterns were examined to determine
how these factors increase the risk of HINI spreading
from a hotspot region into major global population
centers. This model can be generalized to the country
and airport level to determine which locations are
most vulnerable to importation ofEIDs through trade
and travel (Hosseini et al. 2010). This methodology
could be crucial for identifying airports or transportation centers where pathogen monitoring and intervention will be particularly effective in preventing
disease spread.
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TECHNOLOGICAL

ADVA~CES

Recent technological advances have improved our
ability to identify high-risk interfaces for disease
transmission and to detect novel pathogens before
widespread spillover occurs. These advances include
improvements in information technology, molecular
diagnostics, and risk modeling. Further advances
in communications technology will serve to bring
countries traditionally isolated from international
health networks into the global fold. Developments
over the past 15 years allow us to gather reports from
disparate sources and use the Internet as a common
platform for exchanging information. Examples
include the Global Public Health Intelligence Network,
the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases, and
HealthMap (http://www.healthmap.org). The greatest limitations of these networks are the underlying
limitations of the national reporting systems and their
bias towards English-speaking countries (Keller et al.
2009). Telemedicine, or cell phone-mediated medical diagnoses, will allow technologically underserved
areas to leapfrog ahead without enduring massive
infrastructure changes, due in great part to the nearubiquitous use of cell phones in much of the developing world. Systems are now being created to allow
medical care providers to text coded reports to be
analyzed en masse (Yang et al. 2009). Similarly, monitoring the frequency of specific disease-related terms
in daily Internet postings, search queries, or SMS text
messages is now providing alternative forms of disease
surveillance (Ginsberg et al. 2009). The extent to
which telemedicine and the Internet decrease the disparity between countries in regard to access to health
information and capacity to detect EIDs remains to be
seen, but our increased capacity to reach understudied
areas suggests that this will be significant.
Platforms for pathogen discovery and our ability to
follow footprints ofinfectious agents require the laboratory and computational infrastructure sufficiently
powerful to dissect complex host-microbe interactions. For example, MassTag PCR is a multiplex platform that allows animal and human health specialists
and epidemiologists to simultaneously test one sample
for the presence of up to 30 different agents. MassTag
PCR is a powerful tool for genomics, molecular virology, computational biology, surveillance, pathogen
discovery, outbreak detection, and epidemiological
investigations (Lipkin 2010).

CONCLLSIOI\S
EIDs are a growing and complex threat to global
public health. Diseases emerge when socioeconomic
or environmental changes provide the optimal conditions for pathogens to exploit new host populations,
increase in pathogenicity, or otherwise amplify transmission. We present a broad-scale, strategic approach
for selecting geographic sites and species for sampling
and then present a framework for making predictions
about the future risk of EIDs from wildlife. In our
view, the best approach to detecting and preventing
the next emerging infectious disease before it becomes
a pandemic threat is through building a broad coalition of partners to discover, detect, and monitor diseases at the wildlife-human interface using a localized,
risk-based approach. These efforts can integrate predictive modeling, digital sensing, on-the-ground
surveillance, and advanced molecular techniques at
critical points for disease emergence, which then feed
back to models for testing and refinement.
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